For most of the three decades after the Cold War, multilateralism rested on a quiet assumption. The major powers might disagree, but they shared an interest in keeping the institutional machinery running. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and expanded its role across UN agencies. The United States, despite its unilateral moments, remained the system's principal architect and funder.
That assumption no longer holds. Strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing now runs through trade rules, technology standards, development finance and even the election of agency heads. Institutions built on consensus are discovering that great power competition makes consensus scarce.
The real question is not whether multilateralism survives but what form it takes. History offers several precedents: the rival blocs of the Cold War, the managed concert of nineteenth-century Europe, and the rare moments when crisis forced genuine reform. Understanding which pressures matter most, and which institutions are built to withstand them, clarifies the choices ahead for governments, businesses and anyone whose work crosses borders.
Competition Pressures: When Every Issue Becomes a Loyalty Test
Multilateral institutions depend on a particular kind of political space. They need room for states to cooperate on one issue while disagreeing on others. Great power rivalry shrinks that space. When Washington and Beijing treat each other as systemic competitors, questions once handled as technical matters become tests of alignment. Telecommunications standards, supply chain rules and development lending all fall into this category.
Middle powers feel this pressure most acutely. In 2015 the United States urged allies not to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Britain joined anyway, and Germany, France and Italy soon followed. The pattern has intensified since then. States increasingly face choices framed as binary, such as which 5G vendors to trust and which payment systems to rely on. Many respond by hedging: they deepen ties with both sides and commit fully to neither. India, Indonesia, Brazil and the Gulf states have turned hedging into something close to a doctrine.
Consensus-based bodies suffer most. The WTO's dispute settlement system has been largely paralysed since 2019. That year the United States blocked new appointments to the Appellate Body, partly because of concerns about how trade rules handled state-led economies such as China's. In the UN Security Council, the veto has always limited what the body can do. Rivalry now extends that deadlock into areas where the permanent members once found narrow common ground.
The deeper damage is to trust in institutional neutrality. When every vote is read as a proxy contest, secretariats lose authority. Smaller members lose confidence that rules will be applied evenly. An institution can survive open disagreement among its members. It struggles to survive the suspicion that it has become an instrument of one side.
TakeawayRivalry rarely destroys institutions outright. It politicises them, turning technical cooperation into a loyalty test, and that slow erosion of neutrality often does more harm than open withdrawal.
Institutional Resilience: Which Bodies Bend and Which Break
Not every institution is equally exposed. The Cold War offers a useful guide. Despite four decades of superpower confrontation, the Universal Postal Union kept mail moving and the International Civil Aviation Organization kept international skies coordinated. The World Health Organization led the campaign that eradicated smallpox. The Soviet Union proposed that effort, and the United States helped fund it.
These bodies shared features that made them hard to weaponise. They delivered benefits both blocs needed. Their work was technical rather than distributive. Defection carried immediate costs: a country that walks away from global aviation coordination cannot easily fly its planes abroad. In these areas, cooperation helps everyone and no one gains relative advantage by obstructing it. That combination is the core of institutional resilience.
The most vulnerable institutions sit at the opposite end of the spectrum. Competition concentrates where rules shape economic or technological advantage: trade regimes, standards bodies for emerging technologies, and development finance. The 2022 contest for leadership of the International Telecommunication Union set an American candidate against a Russian one. It showed that even technical agencies become battlegrounds once the stakes include the architecture of future networks.
A second distinction matters. Institutions with independent resources and professional secretariats tend to outlast those that depend on constant political agreement. The IMF and World Bank have weighted voting and their own balance sheets, so they can keep functioning through disagreement among members. Bodies that require unanimity for most decisions risk becoming what scholars call zombie institutions. They still hold meetings, but they no longer shape behaviour.
TakeawayAsk of any institution whether its benefits are shared or relative. Where cooperation helps everyone and obstruction helps no one, institutions endure; where gains are measured against rivals, they become arenas.
Adaptation Scenarios: Parallel Systems, Concerts, or Reform
Multilateralism is unlikely to follow a single path. Three broad scenarios capture the range of possibilities, and elements of each are already visible.
The first is parallel institutions. China has built alternatives alongside existing bodies. These include the AIIB, the New Development Bank created with its BRICS partners, and the CIPS payment system, which offers a partial alternative to Western financial plumbing. The United States and its partners have formed their own clubs, such as the Quad and various supply chain initiatives. Parallel systems need not mean collapse, because overlapping institutions can compete for members by offering better terms. They do, however, risk producing incompatible standards and a world where cooperation stops at bloc boundaries.
The second is a great power concert, loosely modelled on the Concert of Europe after 1815. In this arrangement, major powers informally manage crises and respect each other's core interests. Concerts can deliver stability, but smaller states pay for it. They lose their voice, and spheres of influence tend to be drawn at their expense. The G20 briefly worked this way during the 2008 financial crisis. Its convening power has weakened as rivalry has grown.
The third is reformed multilateralism. Voting shares would be redistributed and Security Council representation broadened, so that rising powers gain a stake in existing rules rather than reasons to build alternatives. This is the most attractive scenario and the hardest to achieve, because incumbents must give up influence before a crisis forces them to. Historically, major institutional redesigns have followed systemic shocks, as Bretton Woods and the UN did after 1945. The open question is whether reform can come from foresight rather than catastrophe.
TakeawayThe likeliest future is a layered mix rather than any single scenario: universal bodies for shared technical needs, rival clubs for contested domains, and a narrow channel where great powers manage crises.
Multilateralism is not ending, but its era of assumed universality is. Institutions designed for broad consensus now operate in a world where the two largest powers see each other as rivals.
The most effective responses will likely be modular. Insulate the technical bodies that serve everyone from geopolitical contests. In domains where competing arrangements are unavoidable, invest in interoperability between them. Middle powers have the most to lose from fragmentation, so their collective leverage should push for reforms that incumbents would otherwise delay.
Durable institutions have always reflected the distribution of power they govern. The task now is to adapt them deliberately, before rivalry or crisis does it for us.