It usually arrives as a shrug. Someone proposes a four-day week, a shared approach to housing, or a world with fewer prisons, and the reply comes back with calm finality: it's a nice idea, but you can't change human nature. The conversation ends there. The proposal hasn't been refuted. It has been ruled out of bounds.
The phrase sounds like biology. It presents itself as a modest acknowledgement of facts, the way one might note that humans need sleep or cannot breathe underwater. But notice what it actually does. It takes the present arrangement of things, with its competition, its hierarchies, and its winners and losers, and quietly moves it from history into the body. What was made becomes what simply is.
This is one of the most effective political moves available, precisely because it does not look political at all. To call something natural is to place it beyond debate. So the question is not only whether such claims are true. It is also whose interests they serve when they are made.
Naturalizing Hierarchy
The appeal to nature has a long and uncomfortable record. In the Politics, Aristotle argued that some people are slaves by nature, fitted for obedience in the way the body is fitted to serve the soul. The argument suited a society whose economy rested on enslaved labour. It did not so much describe Athenian slavery as excuse it.
The pattern repeats with striking consistency. In 1851, the American physician Samuel Cartwright described 'drapetomania', a supposed mental illness that caused enslaved people to flee captivity. The desire for freedom became a symptom. Two decades later, the Harvard physician Edward Clarke warned that rigorous education would damage women's reproductive health by diverting energy to the brain. Science was enlisted to show that the excluded were excluded for their own good.
These arguments share more than error. They share a structure. Each one observes a social outcome produced by force, law, and custom, then reads it backwards as evidence of innate capacity. Women were barred from universities, so their absence proved unfitness. Enslaved people were denied literacy, so illiteracy proved inferiority. The effects of domination were recycled as its justification.
Foucault called this kind of operation a regime of truth: a set of discourses and institutions that determine what counts as knowledge and who gets to speak it. Naturalization works because it converts a political claim, this is how things should be, into an empirical one, this is how things are. If you contest the first, you are arguing politics. If you contest the second, you seem to be arguing against reality itself. That imbalance is the source of its power. It has also outlived every specific version that has since been discredited.
TakeawayWhen a social arrangement is described as natural, ask how it was produced and who would lose if it changed. Nature rarely needs enforcement, but hierarchies always do.
The Social Ape
If human nature were as fixed as its political uses suggest, people across societies would behave in broadly similar ways. The evidence points elsewhere. In 2010, the anthropologist Joseph Henrich and colleagues showed that most psychological research drew on a narrow slice of humanity they called WEIRD: Western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic. On many measures, this group turned out to be outliers rather than the human baseline.
Consider fairness. When researchers ran economic bargaining games across fifteen small-scale societies, offers varied enormously. Among the Machiguenga of Peru, people readily made and accepted low offers. Among the Lamalera whale hunters of Indonesia, whose survival depends on cooperative hunts, average offers exceeded half the pot. The self-interested rational actor of economics textbooks was not human nature. It was one cultural pattern among many.
Even our primate relatives refuse to stay still. Robert Sapolsky spent decades studying a baboon troop in Kenya. When its most aggressive males died after eating tainted meat from a tourist rubbish dump, the troop's culture shifted. It became more relaxed, with less bullying of subordinates. This persisted for years, as new males who joined the troop adopted its gentler norms. If baboons can change their social character, the case for human fixity looks thin.
None of this means humans are blank slates. We share capacities for language, cooperation, attachment, and aggression. But these work more like a repertoire than a script. Biology sets the range, and social arrangements determine which possibilities are cultivated and which are starved. The real scientific finding is not that we have no nature. It is that our nature is to be shaped.
TakeawayHuman nature is less a fixed blueprint than a set of possibilities. The question is never whether society shapes us, but which possibilities it chooses to reward.
Making New Humans
Marx put it plainly in his theses on Feuerbach. The human essence, he wrote, is not an abstraction lodged inside each individual but 'the ensemble of the social relations'. In Capital, he added that by acting on the world and changing it, people change their own nature at the same time. Who we are is partly a product of what we do together, and of what we are permitted to do.
This idea carries a necessary warning. The twentieth century saw regimes that promised to forge a 'New Soviet Man' through coercion, re-education, and terror. Those projects failed catastrophically, and their failure is often cited as proof that human nature resists engineering. But the lesson is narrower than that. Transformation imposed from above through violence produces fear and conformity rather than new capacities. It does not follow that people are unchangeable.
In fact, we are being made all the time. Foucault's central insight was that power does not merely constrain individuals who already exist. It produces them. Schools, workplaces, and markets cultivate particular kinds of people: punctual, competitive, self-optimising. The anxious worker who tracks their own productivity is not a timeless human type but a recent creation of specific institutions. Duelling went from an unavoidable matter of honour to an absurdity. Attitudes to hitting children have shifted within living memory.
So the question is not whether humans can be transformed. It is who directs the transformation, and toward what ends. Institutions organised around scarcity and competition tend to produce suspicious, acquisitive people, who then seem to confirm that such institutions were necessary all along. Institutions built on mutual aid, security, and genuine participation might cultivate different capacities. The circle can run in either direction.
TakeawayWe are already being shaped by the institutions around us. The political choice is not between transformation and nature, but between transformations we design together and ones designed for us.
Appeals to human nature present themselves as humility, a sober recognition of limits. More often, they draw a boundary around political imagination. They mark certain futures as fantasy before anyone can argue for them.
History offers a pattern worth remembering. Major expansions of freedom, from abolition to women's suffrage, were dismissed as contrary to nature. The people doing the dismissing were rarely those with the most to gain from change.
None of this guarantees that a better world is possible. It only removes the false certainty that it is not. The next time someone says you can't change human nature, it may be worth asking a quieter question: which version of us is this world currently producing, and could we build one that produces another?