Every transformation is, beneath its declared aims, a contest over power. Reformers speak the language of efficiency, justice or modernisation, but the outcome is decided by which actors emerge able to define the rules of the next order. Karl Polanyi understood this when he described nineteenth-century market society as a political project rather than a natural evolution. It was imposed through state power and resisted by a society that mobilised to protect itself.
Yet power analysis remains the most neglected dimension of transformation strategy. Development plans model incentives, institutions and administrative capacities, but they treat power as background noise rather than as the medium through which change travels. The result is a familiar pattern. Reforms alter formal rules while leaving the underlying distribution of capability intact, and old hierarchies reassert themselves through new channels, often within a single generation.
A useful starting point is Michael Mann's observation that social power flows from four sources: ideological, economic, military and political. These sources rarely move in step. Transformation is the moment when they come unbundled and are reassembled in new configurations. What follows examines that process in three movements: how power is redistributed, how incumbents resist, and how those seeking change can build power deliberately rather than hoping it arrives with the right policy.
Reconfiguration: Power Rarely Disappears, It Migrates
The first principle of power analysis in transformation is that power is rarely abolished. It is relocated. When an order collapses, the capacities that sustained it do not evaporate. Control over land, capital, coercion, information and legitimacy is captured, converted or dispersed. The pattern of that conversion determines the shape of what comes next.
The post-Soviet transitions offer a stark illustration. Members of the nomenklatura who lost formal political authority frequently converted their administrative positions into private ownership during privatisation. Political capital became economic capital, and economic capital later purchased political influence again. The regime changed, but many of the people holding power did not. Analysts called this political capitalism: one form of power converted into another during a moment of institutional fluidity.
South Africa's democratic transition displays a different configuration of the same dynamic. Political power shifted decisively through universal suffrage, while ownership of land, corporate capital and professional skill changed far more slowly. The settlement redistributed the vote more completely than it redistributed the assets on which effective freedom depends. In Amartya Sen's terms, formal entitlements expanded faster than substantive capabilities. That gap became the central political question of the decades that followed.
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson capture this with their distinction between de jure power, which formal institutions allocate, and de facto power, which rests on resources and the capacity to organise. Transformations typically rewrite de jure power quickly. De facto power adjusts slowly. Actors who retain it can bend new institutions toward old interests through lobbying, regulatory capture and selective compliance, or simply because they are the only ones with the expertise to run the new system.
The analytic task, then, is to map power across its sources rather than within a single domain. A transformation that redistributes political authority while leaving economic and ideological power concentrated has produced a new façade on an older structure. Durable transformation requires that changes in one source of power be reinforced by changes in the others. New actors must acquire both rights and the material and organisational means to exercise them.
TakeawayWhen assessing any transformation, look past who holds office to who holds the convertible resources, such as land, capital, coercion and expertise, because those resources tend to decide who holds office next.
Resistance: How Incumbents Absorb, Delay and Capture Change
Incumbent power holders rarely meet transformation threats with open opposition alone. Direct confrontation is costly and visible, and it can clarify the stakes for a wider public. Far more common is a repertoire of subtler responses: delay, dilution, co-optation and capture. This repertoire matters because most transformations fail by being absorbed rather than defeated.
Steven Lukes' three-dimensional view of power explains why. The first dimension is visible conflict over decisions. The second is agenda-setting, the capacity to keep certain issues off the table entirely. The third, and most consequential, shapes preferences themselves, so that subordinate groups come to see existing arrangements as natural or inevitable. Effective resistance operates on all three. The latter two are almost invisible to strategies focused only on winning formal contests.
Albert Hirschman identified the rhetorical forms this resistance takes. Reforms are said to produce the opposite of their intentions, which he called perversity. They are said to change nothing of substance, or futility, or to endanger earlier achievements, or jeopardy. These arguments recur with striking consistency across centuries, deployed against suffrage extension, welfare provision and labour rights. They allow defenders of the status quo to oppose change without appearing to defend privilege.
Perhaps the most instructive pattern is what Joel Hellman called the partial reform equilibrium. In several post-communist economies, the actors who blocked further reform were the early winners of transition rather than its losers. They had profited from partial liberalisation and preferred to freeze the system at the point of maximum rent extraction. Resistance can therefore come from the newly powerful as readily as from the old guard.
Polanyi's double movement adds a further complication. Some resistance is not incumbent self-defence. It is society protecting itself against disruptive change imposed from above. Factory legislation, cooperative movements and social insurance all emerged as resistance to market liberalisation. The strategist must distinguish resistance that protects privilege from resistance that protects the capabilities of the vulnerable, a distinction the language of reform frequently obscures.
TakeawayThe most formidable opposition to a transformation may come from those it has already rewarded, who prefer the half-finished version to the complete one.
Strategy: Building Power Before the Window Opens
If power determines outcomes, then transformation strategy must be, at its core, a strategy for building and deploying power. Good ideas, sound evidence and moral clarity are necessary but insufficient. They become consequential only when carried by organised actors who can impose costs, offer credible alternatives, or reshape what seems possible.
Erik Olin Wright offered a useful typology. Ruptural strategies seek decisive breaks with existing institutions. Interstitial strategies build alternative practices in the cracks of the existing order, such as cooperatives, mutual aid networks and community land trusts. Symbiotic strategies use existing institutions to extend popular power while also solving problems for elites. Historical evidence suggests that durable transformations usually combine all three rather than relying on a single logic.
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward contributed a second insight. The power of marginalised groups often lies in disruption, the capacity to withdraw cooperation on which the system depends. Strikes, boycotts and mass non-compliance turn structural position into leverage. Yet disruptive power is episodic. Without organisational infrastructure to translate leverage into institutional gains, mobilisation tends to subside before its achievements are consolidated.
This points to a principle of sequencing. Transformations frequently open windows, such as economic crises, regime collapses and legitimacy shocks, in which power becomes temporarily fluid. Actors who built coalitions, expertise and alternative institutions before the window opened are positioned to shape the reconfiguration. Those who begin organising once it has opened usually arrive after the critical settlements have been struck, often by actors whose organisation was quietly sustained throughout.
Finally, power strategy must attend to its own reproduction. Robert Michels warned that organisations built to challenge oligarchy tend to generate oligarchies of their own. A capability-centred approach, following Sen, offers a corrective. Success is measured by whether the reconfigured order expands the real freedoms of those previously excluded, not by which group gains control. Power gained without that expansion simply replaces one concentration with another.
TakeawayCrises hand power to those who are already organised, so the decisive strategic work of transformation happens in the quiet years before the window opens.
Taken together, these dynamics suggest that transformation is less a passage between two states than a renegotiation of who holds which forms of power, and in what combination. Formal change is the visible surface. The redistribution of de facto capability is the substance.
This reframes the central question of transformation strategy. Deciding which institutions should replace existing ones is only part of it. The harder question is whether new actors will possess the resources, organisation and legitimacy to sustain those institutions against conversion, capture and partial-reform equilibria. Polanyi showed that even market society required continuous political power to establish. No alternative order will arrive by its own momentum.
Sen's insistence on substantive freedom provides the final test. A transformation that reshuffles elites while leaving capabilities unchanged has altered the structure of power without altering its distribution. Genuine change is measured by whether those once acted upon become those who act.