Free Will and Consciousness: What Neuroscience Actually Shows
The neuroscientific case against free will rests on contested interpretations, not settled facts about consciousness and decision.
Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics: Separating Science from Speculation
Why invoking quantum mechanics to explain consciousness may multiply mysteries rather than solve them.
Blindsight: Vision Without Visual Consciousness
When patients accurately respond to stimuli they cannot see, the neural basis of awareness comes into sharp focus.
Infant Consciousness: When Does Subjective Experience Begin?
The neural and behavioral evidence suggests consciousness emerges gradually, challenging both conception and birth as clear starting points.
The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
Your sense of being someone is a transparent model—invisible to itself, constructed by the brain, revealed only when it breaks.
The Extended Mind Hypothesis Reconsidered: When Does Cognition Really Extend?
New criteria for distinguishing genuine cognitive extension from sophisticated tool use in the age of neural interfaces.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness: Progress Report After Three Decades
Three decades of consciousness research reveal sharpened questions, constrained theories, and a transformed understanding of what explaining phenomenal experience would actually require.
Predictive Processing and the Construction of Conscious Experience
How your brain constructs reality through prediction and error—and what happens when the machinery misfires.
Why Global Workspace Theory Remains the Leading Scientific Theory of Consciousness
How Baars and Dehaene's broadcasting model outperforms competitors on empirical grounds while honestly confronting its explanatory limits
Why Panpsychism Is Making a Scientific Comeback
How mathematical theories of consciousness forced mainstream science to reconsider the radical possibility that experience is woven into nature's fabric from the ground up.
Neural Correlates of Consciousness: What We Actually Know
Distinguishing what we've truly discovered about consciousness from what we've merely assumed—and why the difference reshapes everything.
Embodied Cognition and the Impossibility of Disembodied AI Consciousness
Why genuine machine consciousness may require artificial bodies, not just sophisticated algorithms—and what kind of embodiment might suffice.
Split-Brain Patients and the Unity of Consciousness
Severed connections reveal that the unified self may be an achievement of neural integration rather than a metaphysical given.
Why Integrated Information Theory Fails to Explain Machine Consciousness
Examining why integrated information's mathematical precision cannot capture what matters most about conscious experience in artificial systems.