The Hidden Philosophy Behind Every Psychology Experiment
Your experimental design has already answered philosophical questions you never asked.
The Measurement Problem Psychology Doesn't Talk About
Psychology's quantitative methods rest on assumptions about measurement that the field has never adequately examined.
The Self in Psychological Theory: One Concept or Many?
Mapping the fragmented landscape where psychology's many self-concepts meet, collide, and resist unification
The Return of Instinct: Why Evolutionary Psychology Revived Nativist Thinking
How evolutionary thinking transformed psychology's foundational assumptions about nature and nurture
What Would a Mature Science of Psychology Look Like?
Why emulating physics may be the wrong goal for psychological science—and what genuine maturity might look like instead.
How the Replication Crisis Reveals Deeper Theoretical Problems
Failed replications expose psychology's theoretical foundations, not just its methods—demanding conceptual reconstruction alongside methodological reform.
What Makes an Explanation Psychological Rather Than Neurological
Psychology earns its scientific territory through functional explanation—capturing patterns of mind that neural description alone cannot reveal.
Why Psychology Has So Many Competing Theories of the Same Phenomenon
Understanding why psychology sustains multiple theoretical frameworks reveals deep truths about psychological knowledge and how it advances
The Problem of Psychological Kinds: Are Depression and Anxiety Real Categories?
Examining whether our most familiar psychological categories describe genuine mental realities or useful fictions that organize suffering without revealing its true structure.
When Theories Compete: The Logic of Paradigm Wars in Psychology
A framework for understanding when psychological paradigm wars advance knowledge and when they merely entrench confusion.
How Attachment Theory Achieved Theoretical Integration
Examining why attachment theory succeeded where other psychological frameworks remained fragmented, and what principles enable theories to achieve broad explanatory integration.
Why Reductionism Never Quite Works in Psychology
Understanding why complete brain knowledge still wouldn't replace psychological explanation reveals the distinctive nature of mental science.
When Models Replace Theories: The Transformation of Psychological Explanation
Has psychology traded understanding minds for merely predicting behavior? The distinction determines whether we can ever truly know why we think and feel.